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ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AS A MEANS FOR PROMOTING
REGIONAL POLITICAL STABILITY: LESSONS FROM THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND MERCOSUR
THOMAS ANDREW O'KEEFE, ESQ.*
INTRODUCTION
The cataclysmic breakup of the former Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via during the 1990s resulted in the creation of at least five new countries
and a protectorate administered by the United Nations. Even the loose fed-
eration established in February 2003 between Montenegro and Serbia may
yet lead to full Montenegrin independence. The small internal markets of
many of these new countries, several of which have their own separate, and
often nonconvertible currencies, gives rise to concerns about their future
viability as stable economic and political entities. Membership in the EU
provides one solution to this dilemma, but other than Slovenia, which
joined in May 2004, and Croatia,1 accession by the others appears remote
at the present time. Accordingly, regional economic integration provides
another, more immediate alternative by offering the prospects of economies
of scale for local producers, and the reestablishment of broken chains of
production as well as the creation of new ones so as to enhance export
competitiveness. In addition, an economically integrated Balkans enhances
the region's ability to attract much needed foreign direct investment.
Although the widespread atrocities directed against civilian popula-
tions are still fresh in the memories of many living within the territory of
the former Yugoslavia, the desperate need to encourage economic growth
and create new jobs provides an important incentive for more pragmatically
oriented democratic leaders to overlook past wounds and promote regional
economic integration. By including countries such as Albania, Bulgaria,
and Romania, which were not directly involved in the recent bloodshed, the
project's political viability is enhanced. An economically integrated Bal-
* The author is President of Washington, D.C., based Mercosur Consulting Group, Ltd.,
http://www.mercosurconsulting.net, and teaches courses on Western Hemisphere economic integration
at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs and Johns Hopkins
University's School of Advanced International Studies.
1. See, e.g., A Club in Need ofa New Vision, ECONOMIST, May 1, 2004, at 25 27.
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kans may also facilitate eventual accession by all the participating states
into the EU by providing solutions to at least some of the problems that, if
not adequately redressed, can only impede their membership indefinitely.
Perhaps most importantly, promoting an effective project to economi-
cally integrate the countries of the Balkans offers a more realistic way to
resolve Kosovo's current limbo status as a de facto independent entity that
is formally under Serb sovereignty yet administered by the U.N. If the ex-
ample of the EU is taken as a model, a fully functioning Balkans economic
union would mean greater economic and political autonomy for Kosovo
regardless if, under international law, it technically remained under Serb
sovereignty (albeit in the form of a loose confederation). Even if the option
of full independence is pursued, an economically integrated Balkans en-
hances Kosovo's ability to prosper. An integrated Balkans also allows
Kosovo to stand on its own feet economically without incorporation into a
Greater Albania, whose creation could well plunge the Balkans into re-
newed conflict.
This paper examines the experiences of the EU and MERCOSUR in-
tegration projects that have led to permanent peaceful relations among the
participating countries and contributed to overcoming historically bitter
rivalries and conflicts. In particular, the paper attempts to focus on lessons
that can be gleaned from these two economic integration projects that may
be relevant for any effort to integrate the Balkan countries (including, per-
haps, the eventual establishment of some form of political union). Examin-
ing the EU experience with regionalism is especially relevant to any
discussion of Kosovo's final status, because it may provide a pertinent
model for ensuring Kosovo's future economic viability and territorial and
cultural integrity, thereby avoiding the outbreak of another war in the
Balkans.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A RESPONSE TO THE
CARNAGE OF WORLD WAR II AND ITS ULTIMATE GOAL OF POLITICAL
UNION
The idea of a formal political union in Europe flourished in the wan-
ing days of the Second World War and in the immediate postwar period.
Historian Anthony Sutcliffe relays that:
In Italy, many of the imprisoned opponents of Mussolini developed a
case for a federal Europe after the war as the only way to prevent future
conflicts.... In 1944 the European Resistance movements, of which the
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French was the largest and the most successflil, met in Geneva where
they drafted a declaration calling for a federal Europe after the war.2
The main advocate for political union was the European Union of Federal-
ists, an organization founded in 1943. 3
Sutcliffe continues:
[A]t a conference of the main European federalist organizations at The
Hague in May 1948, a proposal for a European parliament was rejected
in favour of the idea of the Council of Europe, with a Council of Minis-
ters and a Consultative Assembly nominated by the national govern-
ments. This weak, consultative body, which was largely the result of
British objections to the loss of sovereign power [that a European Par-
liament presumably entailed,] was set up at Strasbourg in 1949. This
modest result was a disappointment for the federalists, who never again
reached the same degree of influence with European governments. From
now onwards, the locus of European integration switched to the eco-
nomic and military [sectors]. 4
This does not mean, however, that the vision of eventual political union
was abandoned. It is just that more pragmatic advocates of a Federal
Europe, such as Jean Monnet of France, recognized that by first focusing
on the establishment of economic links, even if limited in their scope, this
could generate broader cooperation in the long run.5
Interestingly, from June 1948 onwards the operation of Marshall aid
became an important pillar supporting efforts at western European eco-
nomic integration. 6 In 1949, the Economic Cooperation Administration
(which oversaw implementation of the Marshall Plan) adopted economic
integration in Europe as a central policy. 7 In order to facilitate intraregional
2. ANTHONY SUTCLIFFE, AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE SINCE
1945, at 106 (1996). The joint declaration described federation as "the only means of European survival
and the only method through which Germany could rejoin the European family." See HANS A.
SCHMITT, THE PATH TO EUROPEAN UNION 16 (1962).
3. SUTCLIFFE, supra note 2, at 106.
4. Id. at 107. British opposition is ironic given that "[iun June 1940, the British government,
eager to keep its stricken French ally in [WW 11], offered to unite Britain and France as a single state."
Id. at 102-03. "This unusual, if not to say desperate, offer was the brainchild of a French diplomat, and
former businessman, Jean Monnet," Id. at 103. Also, "Winston Churchill had been a warm supporter of
the political approach to European integration." Id. at 110.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 108. Already in January 1947, then U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had
made an important speech before the National Association of Publishers in New York entitled "Europe
must federate or perish." Id. at 107. This support marked a remarkable shift in opinion given that during
the Second World War the prevailing wisdom in Washington, D.C., seemed to be that a postwar "Euro-
pean union was not especially desirable from the American point of view" because it might, inter alia,
injure American trade. SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 13.
7. SUTCLIFFE, supra note 2, at 108-09. Until the idea was rejected by the British, the United
States also initially advocated the creation of a strong supranational body to oversee implementation of
the Marshall aid program. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 35 (Peter
M.R. Stirk & David Weigall eds., 1999) [hereinafter Stirk & Weigall].
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trade, the European Payments Union was founded as a central clearing
house mechanism on 'July 1, 1950, to overcome previous problems associ-
ated with restrictive national monetary exchange controls.8
On May 9, 1950, then French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman pro-
posed the integration of coal and steel production in Europe under the con-
trol of a "common high authority." 9 The coal and steel plan, which
included the creation of a body with supranational authority, was deemed
by its French proponents as a route towards European cooperation on a
broader scale.' 0 The plan sought to integrate the production and exchange
of iron and steel products between Germany and France, and such other
producer countries as might wish to join. Germany, France, Italy, and the
three Benelux countries agreed to discuss the plan. 1 The basic thrust of the
plan, as understood by all the members, was to overcome traditional
French-German enmity by closely linking sectors historically identified as
underpinning the war machine. 12
The European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") was formally es-
tablished in August 1952 on the basis of the Treaty of Paris, which had
been signed in April 1951.13 The economic success of the ECSC, which
had a partial Common External Tariff ("CET"), suggested that a broader
customs union might be the ideal vehicle for achieving European integra-
8. SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 25. Schmitt describes:
To the deficit or surplus which any of [the 16 countries that made up the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)] might have acquired in a bilateral [trade] partner-
ship, would be added the balances, negative or positive, with the remaining OEEC associates.
If the Final sum showed a surplus, the Union would be the debtor. If the reverse turned out to
be the case, the country in question would owe the Union.
Id. at 26.
9. SUTCLIFFE, supra note 2, at 110. The intellectual author of the proposed European Coal and
Steel Community was Jean Monnet who, as previously noted, was the French Minister who proposed to
Churchill the union of France and Great Britain on the eve of WW 1I. 1d; see also note 4.
10. SUTCLIFFE, supra note 2, at I ll. "Integration entrusted to a [supranational body] independent
of national supervision was at the heart of Monnet's thinking.... [Tihe birth and history of the Council
of Europe had demonstrated to him that no government in Europe was ready to abdicate [sovereignty]
in the political sphere." SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 59. Accordingly, cooperation in the coal and steel
sectors might prove a less sensitive area to experiment with the concept of supranationality without
incurring immediate opposition. Id.
11. SUTCLIFFE, supra note 2, at I 11.
12. Id. The basic idea was that integrating the steel industry, through the use of coal obtained in
Germany's Ruhr and Saar valleys with iron ore from French Lorraine, would make it economically
unfeasible for Germany to ever start another war. Id. at 112.
13. The underlying premise for the ECSC was that "'[p]ermanent free trade' could not be 'attained
without the transfer of powers to supranational authorities."' SCHMITT, supra note 2, at 88. The creation
of the ECSC had the support of the United States, "which was pleased to see the creation of effective
European institutions." SUTCLIFFE, supra note 2, at 113. No doubt, the U.S. was also won over by
Monnet's arguments that an ECSC would prevent the emergence of a monopolistic steel cartel in
Europe. See. e.g., Stirk & Weigall, supra note 7, at 63.
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tion. 14 Equally as important, the ECSC began the process of liberating
France from a "counterproductive desire to find security through strategies
of dismemberment and the restriction of German production."' 5
In late 1954, the six governments that made up the ECSC began to
consider a new economic initiative that would complement their original
coal and steel pact. 16 These discussions eventually led to the March 1957
signing of the Treaties of Rome instituting Euratom (i.e., the European
Atomic Energy Commission) and the European Economic Community
("EEC").17 The latter sought to establish a customs union among the initial
six participating states, develop common policies on transport and agricul-
ture, prohibit monopolies, and assist less well-off regions through a Social
Fund and Investment Bank.' 8 The creators of the Treaties of Rome were
not, however, primarily motivated in establishing an economic union.19
Instead, they saw economic integration as a step towards political union,
the hope being that political unity would eventually evolve out of closer
economic cooperation.20
The end of military dictatorships in Greece, Portugal, and Spain dur-
ing the 1970s opened the way for Greek accession into the EEC in 1981,
followed by Portugal and Spain in 1986.21 Because democracy was a pre-
requisite for membership, accession into the EEC was viewed by the
Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish governments as a means of guaranteeing
the preservation of their democratic institutions. 22
II. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE REGIONS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
Regarding regionalism, Sonia Mazey writes:
14. SUTCLIFFE, supra note 2, at 116. The ECSC had a significant impact on the availability of
housing in the coal and steel regions, it helped to reduce discrimination in freight rates, and it served as
the catalyst for an increase in intra-ECSC trade that far outstripped increased production and trade with
other states. Stirk & Weigall, supra note 7, at 72.
15. Stirk & Weigall, supra note 7, at 72.
16. Id. at 125.
17. Id. at 124.
18. Id. at 130.
19. Id. at 124
20. See, e-g., SUTCLIFFE, supra note 2, at 116; Stirk & Weigall, supra note 7, at 124. Behind the
arrangements on trade there was an implicit political agenda. With the customs union and, more far
reaching, the creation of common policies or the progressive coordination of national policies, the
Community would produce "closer relations between the Member States." Stirk & Weigall, supra note
7, at 130.
21. DICK LEONARD, THE ECONOMIST: GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 320-21 (8th ed. 2002).
22. Stirk & Weigall, supra note 7, at 249.
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[Alt]hough not officially recognized as partners in the founding treaties
of the European Community, regional authorities throughout the [EU]
have, since the early 1980s, become increasingly involved in [first the
EEC and now EU] policy process. This change has been accompanied by
the emergence of an increasingly assertive "regional lobby" in Brussels
and growing support for a "Europe of the regions."
'23
Part of the explanation for this development can be traced to the ratification
of the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and its underlying general principle of
"subsidiarity." 24 Federalists have used subsidiarity to argue not only for
more Community action but also for greater participation by the regions of
member states in EU rulemaking.25 "In short, European integration has
prompted the emergence of new regional groupings, networks and proc-
esses which transcend the territorial and legal parameters of 'old' regions
defined by the nation-state. '26
The increasing importance given to regional authorities by the EU in
terms of formulating and implementing overall policy and legislation helps
to explain another interesting phenomenon. Among the biggest supporters
of the EU are ethnic groups or inhabitants of nations long subsumed into
larger states but still resentful of central rule from that country's capital.
With Brussels increasingly the locus of rulemaking power and a source of
generous economic aid (coupled with monetary policy being set for most
by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt), the traditional stranglehold
exerted by central governments on regional, cultural, and economic devel-
23. Sonia Mazey, Regional Lobbying in the New Europe, in THE REGIONS AND THE NEW EUROPE:
PATTERNS IN CORE AND PERIPHERY DEVELOPMENT 78 (Martin Rhodes ed., 1995). Undoubtedly, "[tihe
[EU's] regional policy and the associated structural funds have [also] played an important catalytic role
in the development of a regional lobby." Id. at 83.
24. Pursuant to Article 3b of the Treaty of Maastricht:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action,
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only and if and in so far as the objectives of
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore,
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
RicHARD CORBETT, THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT FROM CONCEPTION TO RATIFICATION: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE 388 (1993). The Treaty of Maastricht, which formally brought the
EU into existence in 1993, also established a Committee of the Regions as an advisory body to be
consulted by the European Commission or the European Council. Id. at 424.
25. Stirk & Weigall, supra note 7, at 277. Particularly, since the 1992 single market program,
regional authorities "have become increasingly subject to and responsible for implementing EC legisla-
tion." Mazey, supra note 23, at 81. They have, therefore, "repeatedly argued that they should be in-
volved in the formulation of European policies." Id.
26. Mazey, supra note 23, at 80. One, however, should be cautious of how far the EU is willing to
go in overtly encouraging regionalist ambitions, for fear of antagonizing powerful member govern-
ments. For example, efforts by Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders, and the German Lander to have a bigger
role for the regions written into the proposed EU constitution were rebuffed as a result of pressure from
France and Spain. In addition, as one EU official has pointed out, "it's already a nightmare trying to
secure agreement between 15 member states, and it's going to get worse after enlargement to 25. It will
be totally impossible if we have to deal with more powerful regional governments as well." Europe's
Rebellious Regions, ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2003, at 51.
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opment has diminished.2 7 Accordingly, this phenomenon allows regions to
peacefully "break out" of their nation-states without necessarily suffering
any economic penalty or risking bloodshed. For example, an increased
voice for Catalonia in the EU makes demands for independence from Spain
unnecessary. Similarly, increased representation for Flanders in the EU
under the auspices of the Belgian government has diminished separatist
sentiment. On the other hand, Scottish nationalists use the idea of Scot-
land's European vocation as a way of counteracting the fear that independ-
ence might lead to isolation or poverty. 28 According to this view, the 1997
devolution of certain lawmaking functions from London to Edinburgh and
eventual independence for Scotland "are of a piece with the creation of a
federal Europe. '29 A powerful counterargument to this scenario, however,
posits that devolution and the creation of a Federal Europe actually under-
mines the appeal of any separatist movement in Scotland by making full
independence wholly unnecessary and even redundant. 30
III. AN HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND ITS
SPANISH-SPEAKING NEIGHBORS IN THE RIVER PLATE BASIN
During much of the colonial period, the River Plate Basin of South
America was at the front line of the competing imperial interests of Spain
and Portugal. Each nation sought to control the mouth of the River Plate
and access to an extensive mule and waterway system that penetrated into
the interior of the South American continent. 31 As part of that struggle, the
territory of what is today Uruguay passed from Spanish to Portuguese
hands and vice versa several times from the seventeenth through the early
nineteenth centuries. 32 For its part, Paraguay and its Jesuit Missions were
the target of numerous incursions from Portuguese slave raiders and for-
tune seekers, called bandeirantes, which were based in southern Brazil.33
27. ECONOMIST, supra note 26, at 51.
28. Id. The article notes that "[v]isitors to the office of John Swinney, head of the Scottish Nation-
alist Party, find two flags prominently displayed, Scotland's cross of St. Andrew and the yellow stars of
the European Union." Id. The Scottish Nationalists imagine "a thriving statelet within a larger Europe."
Who Wants the Euro, and Why, ECONOMIST, May 2, 1998, at 51.
29. Who Wants the Euro, and Why, supra note 28, at 51.
30. See, e.g., Devolution: The Choice for Scotland and Wales, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 1997, at 56-
58; Devolution Can Be Salvation, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 1997, at 53-54.
31. See, e.g., MARK A. BURKHOLDER & LYMAN L. JOHNSON, COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA 167,
249, 268-69, 287 (3d ed. 1998).
32. Id.; see also DAVID BUSHNELL & NEILL MACAULAY, THE EMERGENCE OF LATIN AMERICA IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 123-25, 162-63 (1988).
33. BURKHOLDER & JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 97, 124.
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Formal independence from Spain in 1816 of the United Provinces of
the River Plate (which technically included Paraguay and Uruguay and
what is today the Argentine Republic) did not end the territorial disputes in
the region as the new Brazilian Empire (itself an outgrowth of the Portu-
guese royal family's forced sojourn in Rio de Janeiro during the Napole-
onic conquest of the Iberian peninsula) eventually annexed Uruguay in
1820. 34 In 1825, the Uruguayans rebelled against their Brazilian overlords
and sought to reestablish a federation with Argentina. 35 The matter of who
controlled Uruguay was finally settled in 1828 when the British, fearful
that renewed warfare between Argentina and Brazil would severely disrupt
their lucrative trade activities in the region, intervened as mediators. 36 The
result was the creation of an independent Eastern Republic of Uruguay. 37
Peace in the River Plate region was again interrupted in 1864 as a re-
sult of the War of the Triple Alliance. Alarmed by what he perceived to be
Argentine and Brazilian interference in the internal affairs of Uruguay (and
a possible attempt by both to dismember the country), then Paraguayan
strongman Francisco Solano L6pez issued strident declarations throughout
1864 in support of the embattled Blanco Party President in Montevideo. 3 8
When the Brazilians actually invaded Uruguay in the fall of 1864, Para-
guay sent troops to capture the interior Brazilian province of Mato Grosso
and seized a Brazilian river boat (whose passengers included the governor
of Mato Grosso) passing through its territory. 39 In March of 1865, Para-
guay formally declared war on Argentina when Buenos Aires refused So-
lano Lopez's request to transit through Argentine territory in order to attack
southern Brazil. 40 This declaration of war was followed weeks later by
Paraguay's capture of the important Argentine river port city of Corri-
entes. 4 1 Argentina finally responded in May 1865 by entering into a Triple
Alliance with Brazil and the new Colorado Party government in Uruguay
(the successor to the embattled Blanco regime that was finally overthrown
with Argentine and Brazilian assistance in February 1865) against what
was now viewed as a dangerously belligerent Paraguayan dictator. 42 The
results of the war that finally ended in 1870 were catastrophic for Para-
34. Id at 320.
35. BUSHNELL & MACAULAY, supra note 32, at 124, 162.
36. Id. at 124 25, 163.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 252-53.
39. Id. at 253.
40. See PELHAM HORTON BOX, THE ORIGINS OF THE PARAGUAYAN WAR 263 (1967).
41. Id. at 267.
42. BUSHNELL & MACAULAY, supra note 32, at 253.
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guay.4 3 Parts of the country were annexed by Argentina and Brazil, and
most able-bodied Paraguayan men had been killed.44
Despite their alliance in the war against Paraguay, Argentine-Brazilian
relations soon frayed in a dispute over who should head the new postwar
government in Paraguay.45 Historian Stanley Hilton relays that:
During [the period of the Brazilian] "Old Republic" (1889-1930), Brazil
observers carefully studied Argentina's commercial and political efforts
in the [River Plate Basin] and concluded that, in her drive for continental
supremacy, [Argentina] was seeking to isolate Brazil... by establishing
a modern version of the Vice-Royalty of La Plata, the Spanish colonial
administrative unit that had included [modem day] Argentina, Uruguay,
Paraguay, and Bolivia. Turn-of-the-century naval purchases [by Argen-
tina,] followed by a World War I [military] build-up and then unprece-
dented [Argentine] defense budgets in the 1920s generated deep anxiety
in [Brazil], where the possibility of war between the two countries was a
permanent theme of strategic discussion.46
WW II exacerbated tensions in Argentine-Brazilian relations, as Ar-
gentina initially remained neutral but became decidedly more sympathetic
to the Axis cause following a military coup in 1943. 47 By contrast, Brazil
sided with the Allies and even sent troops to fight in Italy alongside the
Americans. 48 During this period, the Brazilians feared that Buenos Aires
might launch an attack in coordination with potential fifth columnists re-
cruited among southern Brazil's large population of persons of Italian and
German descent.49
At the conclusion of WW I, Argentina found itself with a deteriorat-
ing economy while Brazil, in contrast, was booming.50 The tax revenues
43. Id. at 256.
44. See CHARLES J. KOLINSKI, INDEPENDENCE OR DEATH! THE STORY OF THE PARAGUAYAN
WAR 198 99 (1965).
45. See generally HARRIS GAYLORD WARREN, PARAGUAY AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE (1978).
46. Stanley A. Hilton, The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy
Strategy, 100 POL. Sci. Q. 27, 28 (1985). "Divergent policies during World War I-Brazil joined the
allies while Argentina remained neutral-resuscitated fears of a military confrontation, which were
[subsequently] fueled in the 1920s by diplomatic clashes, Argentine military preparations, and the
volatile Chaco territorial dispute" that eventually erupted into a war between Bolivia and Paraguay from
1932 until 1935. Id. at 29.
47- Id. at 31. One of the leaders of the 1943 coup was Juan Domingo Peron who used his position,
first as head of the National Labor Department and then at the newly created Secretariat of Labor and
Social Welfare, to build a power base among the Argentine working class that would eventually allow
him to run for and win the presidential election of 1946. Peron was reelected under less than stellar
democratic conditions in 1951 and was unable to finish his second term as a result of a military coup in
1955. See generally Juan Carlos Torre & Liliana de Riz, Argentina Since 1946, in 8 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 73 (Leslie Bethell ed., 199 1).
48. Hilton, supra note 46, at 31.
49. Id.
50. LuIz ALBERTO MONIz BANDEIRA, O Eixo ARGENTINA-BRASIL: O PROCESSO DE INTEGRACAO
DA AMtRICA LATINA 24 (1987).
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generated by sales of higher priced coffee were channeled into continued
expansion of Brazil's industrial sector. 51 In addition, Brazil used its partici-
pation in WW II on the Allied side to get the United States to fund the de-
velopment of Latin America's largest and only fully integrated steelmaking
factory at Volta Redonda. 52 Realizing the bind his country was in, Argen-
tine President Juan Domingo Peron felt compelled to seek closer economic
ties with the other South American republics. 53
In 1948, Argentina and Brazil signed an agreement in which each
country agreed to use the Brazilian cruzeiro as the common currency in
their bilateral trade, favor each others' shipping lines, and set up a commis-
sion to investigate constructing a hydroelectric dam at lguagu from which
Argentina could harness electric power. 54 Peron's attempts to garner closer
commercial links with Brazil were hampered, however, by the great dis-
trust most Brazilian policymakers continued to harbor against Argentina. 55
Furthermore, having just emerged from their own long struggle against the
dictator Getulio Vargas, Brazil's elite did not want to be seen as undermin-
ing the Argentine liberals' struggle against Peron by entering into a close
economic alliance with him.56 In the end, Peron's only concrete contribu-
tion to closer Argentine-Brazilian relations was to inaugurate the first
bridge that directly linked both countries by road.57
During the administration of Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek
(1956-60), the arguments of a newer and generally younger group of for-
eign policy technocrats in Brazil prevailed, namely that an entente with
Argentina was necessary to enhance Latin America's international bargain-
ing power. 58 Brazil's new willingness to deal with Argentina, however,
would have to wait until the civilian government in Argentina of Arturo
51. Id. at 34.
52. Id. at 27.
53. Id. at 24.
54. Id. at 28. Argentina was particularly interested in gaining access to some of Brazil's cheap
hydroelectric power, which by 1943 supplied 82% of Brazil's energy needs, whereas 70% of Argen-
tina's energy demands in 1947 were still met by expensive imported coal and petroleum. Id. at 25.
Peron was also interested in establishing closer economic links with Brazil in order to access cheap
Brazilian iron and steel for his planned expansion of Argentina's heavy industry sector. Id. at 25-28.
55. Illustrative of these fears was the secret session of the Brazilian Congress called on June 10,
1947, to discuss accusations made by an influential congressman that Argentina's support for one of the
two sides in the Paraguayan Civil War of the late 1940s was nothing more than an attempt to gain
control of Paraguay and then attack Brazil. Frank M. Garcia, Grip on Paraguay Charged to Peron,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1947, at 16.
56. MONIZ BANDEIxA, supra note 50, at 29.
57. Inaugurada Ontem a Ponte Internacional Sobre a Rio Uruguai Pelos Presidentes da
Republica do Brasil e da Argentina, 0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, May 22, 1947, at 1.
58. Hilton, supra note 46, at 39.
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Frondizi (1958-62) in order to pay dividends. 59 Facing a growing balance
of payments crisis induced by the end of the Korean War, Frondizi turned
to Argentina's continental neighbors to expand exports and thereby boost
the country's foreign reserves. This need led to the formation of the Latin
American Free Trade Area ("ALALC") in 1960, an organization whose
concept Kubitschek had also earlier championed. 60
In April of 1961, then Presidents Frondizi of Argentina and Janio
Quadros of Brazil (1960-61) met in the Brazilian border town of Uru-
guaiana to discuss their mutual trade problems vis-d-vis the United States
and to spur an equitable increase in Argentine-Brazilian bilateral trade. 61
Both presidents agreed that for the latter to occur, Argentina and Brazil
would have to overcome their traditional military rivalry and cooperate on
economic development matters. 62 Unfortunately the two agreements signed
at Uruguaiana calling for, inter alia, increased legal, economic, financial,
and cultural integration and the free movement of persons between Argen-
tina and Brazil were never fully implemented. 63 Quadros resigned shortly
after signing them and his successor, Jodo Goulart, was absorbed in fight-
ing off domestic political threats that eventually led to his overthrow by the
Armed Forces in 1964.64 Frondizi, for his part, was overthrown in a mili-
tary coup d'&tat in 1962.65
The strong anticommunism of the new Argentine and Brazilian mili-
tary rulers that overthrew Frondizi and Goulart, respectively, initially
united Argentina and Brazil in the mid-1960s in a crusade against a per-
ceived common enemy, Communism. 66 A proposal by the Argentine gov-
ernment headed by General Juan Carlos Ongania (1966-69) to Brazilian
President General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco (1964-67) to
establish a common market between the two countries floundered, how-
ever, as a result of opposition from Argentine industrialists who feared that
it would turn Argentina into an exclusive purveyor of agro-industrial
goods.67 In addition, there was little interest in the proposal on the part of
Brazilian businessmen, who were more interested in servicing their rapidly
59. MoNiz BANDEIRA, supra note 50, at 35.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 37-38.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 38-39.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 41, 44, 46.
67. Id. at 4I, 46-47.
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growing internal market that was heavily protected from foreign competi-
tion by high tariff barriers.68
On April 26, 1973, Paraguay and Brazil signed the Treaty of Itaipi
that allowed Brazil to build a major hydroelectric dam near Iguaqu Falls on
the Parand River separating the two countries. 69 Argentina strongly op-
posed the Itaip6 project, arguing that it would impede river currents flow-
ing into its territory and undermine Argentine plans to build two
hydroelectric stations further downstream. 70 The Argentines also feared
that construction of the Itaip6i dam was a Brazilian attempt to create a new
economic pole that would further isolate undeveloped and sparsely popu-
lated Misiones province from Buenos Aires. 7 1 Despite the death knell it
spelled for efforts at regional economic and political cooperation, Brazil
refused to be dissuaded and embarked on construction of the Itaipfi dam.72
While Argentina's economy continued to stagnate throughout the
early 1970s, Brazil experienced double digit growth rates in GDP. Brazil's
new found economic strength also contributed to its taking on the role of a
regional hegemon, intervening in the internal affairs of its neighbors so as
to prevent leftist ideas and instability from seeping into Brazil and threaten-
ing the country's economic miracle. 73 These Brazilian interventions added
fuel to a growing perception in Spanish America that Brazil was a "key
country" or "privileged satellite" of United States imperialism in the
region. 74
68. Id. at 45. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Brazilian economy experienced an "eco-
nomic miracle" of annual double-digit growth in GDP.
69. Id. at 48.
70. Id. at 48-49.
71. LEONEL ITAUSSU ALMEIDA MELLO, ARGENTINA E BRASIL: A BALANCA DE PODER No CONE
SUL 148 (1996).
72. The Brazilian action, in effect, nullified a treaty that the country had signed in 1969 with
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay to promote the harmonious and physical integration of the
five signatory states through, among other things, the equitable use of the region's water systems.
73. For example, in 1971 the Brazilians financially underwrote Hugo Banzer's overthrow of the
leftist General Juan Jos6 Torres in Bolivia, providing Banzer with air support and stationing troops at
the border in the Brazilian State of Mato Grosso in the event their intervention in Bolivia was required.
MONIZ BANDEIRA, supra note 50, at 54. Similarly, Brazilian troops were stationed on the Uruguayan
border in 1971 poised to invade the country in the event the leftist Frente Amplio won the presidential
election of that year. Id. at 54-55. Following the coup d'6tat in 1973, Brazil provided the new Uru-
guayan military government with generous financial credits, intelligence help, training in torture tech-
niques, and VW buses for the security forces. Id. at 55. Brazil played a similar role in Chile after the
1973 military overthrow of democratically elected Salvador Allende-
74. Id- at 60. This explains the widespread sense of alarm generated by a December 1971 remark
made by then U.S. President Richard M. Nixon during a welcoming ceremony at the White House for
Brazilian President General Emilio Medici "that as Brazil goes so will the rest of that Latin American
continent." See, e.g., Joseph Novitski, Medici Denies Brazil is Seeking Domination over Latin America,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1971, at 3.
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As the 1970s drew to a close, Brazil's military leaders came to the
conclusion that the country's national development could not be achieved
separate from the Latin American context. 75 As a way of more fully rein-
corporating itself into the Latin American political community, in 1978
Brazil signed, along with Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela,
Guyana, and Surinam, the Amazonic Cooperation Treaty. 76 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Brazil began making overtures to the Andean Pact countries and prom-
ised to contribute to their regional development programs and to increase
imports from them.77
Brazil took the first important step of mending fences with Argentina
when it signed a Tripartite Agreement with Argentina and Paraguay on
October 19, 1979, which ended the controversy over the Itaipd dam.78 This
move coincided with Argentina's own desire to resolve any problems it
may have had with Brazil as a result of the deepening of Buenos Aires's
dispute with Chile in the Beagle Channel and an awareness of the Chileans
traditional close diplomatic ties with Brazil. 79 If war were to break out with
Chile, Argentina was anxious to avoid the formation of a second front on
its northern border. 80
IV. THE 1980S RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
Between May 14 and May 17, 1980, then Brazilian President General
Jodo Bautista Figueiredo visited Buenos Aires at the invitation of his Ar-
gentine counterpart, General Jorge Videla. While in Argentina, Figueiredo
signed some fifteen agreements that pledged closer Argentine-Brazilian
cooperation in the nuclear energy field, electricity, taxation, scientific and
technological research, and health.8 1 It was also announced that a bilateral
75. Wayne A. Selcher, Current Dynamics and Future Prospects of Brazil's Relations with Latin
America: Toward a Pattern of Bilateral Cooperation, J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF., Summer
1986, at 67, 68-69. By the late 1970s and until 1982, South American markets had become the most
dynamic in the world for Brazilian exports, representing 18.1% and 19.3% of total Brazilian exports for
1980 and 1981 respectively (shares larger than those absorbed by the United States). Id. at 81.
76. By this treaty the signatory states pledged themselves to promote the rational occupation and
economic development of the Amazon region as well as to encourage the economic and social integra-
tion of the eight signatory states. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978, 1202 U.N.TS. 71.
77. Los inculos de Brasil con el Grupo Andino, LA NACI6N, Oct. 17, 1979, at 2.
78. As a result of the Tripartite Agreement, Brazil agreed to reduce its original plan from twenty
to eighteen turbines and to regulate water flows through the ltaip6t dam throughout the year so as not to
affect river traffic and the planned Argentine-Paraguayan dam at Corpus further downstream. Acordo
de Itaipu Reativa Antigos Projetos, JORNAL DO BRASIL, Oct- 19, 1979, at 23.
79. ITAUSSU ALME1DAMELLO, supra note 71, at 150.
80. Id.
81. Meta 6 Criar Bases Politica e Juridica, JORNAL DO BRASIL, May 18, 1980, at 22. In particular,
both countries agreed to share hydroelectric power obtained from the Uruguay River and its tributaries,
interconnect the two countries' electrical systems, build a military plane together, eliminate effects of
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commission would be created to study ways of economically integrating
the two countries. 82 Undoubtedly, the most important of the agreements
signed by Videla and Figueiredo was the one calling for technological co-
operation in the production of nuclear reactors and components, bilateral
trade in nuclear material, joint research efforts in uranium processing, and a
common position with respect to the international community. 83 In signing
these accords, Argentina and Brazil effectively ended a rumored nuclear
anns race that had commenced between them in the early 1970s and threat-
ened to destabilize the whole continent.
Further efforts at closer economic integration between Argentina and
Brazil during the early 1980s were stymied by the fact that the Argentine
economic team, headed by Jos& Martinez de Hoz, was forced to resign in
1981. Another important factor was the inauguration of a new, conservative
administration in Washington, D.C., in January 1981 that led Argentina's
military leaders to temporarily favor closer political and economic ties with
the United States over those with Brazil.8 4 Whatever illusions the Argen-
tine military may have had regarding the benefits closer U.S. ties would
bring them were quickly shattered when the Reagan administration backed
Britain in the Malvinas dispute in 1982. That betrayal forced the Argentine
military government to look for diplomatic support in Latin America as
part of the country's effort to recover the islands, including support from
traditional rival Brazil.
The 1982 Argentine defeat by the British in the South Atlantic gener-
ated considerable introspection in Argentina and caused the Brazilian mili-
tary to rethink their premises about Argentina as a serious military threat or
a country likely to engage in any future military adventures. 85 As a result of
the Malvinas fiasco, a new concept of national security began to emerge in
both Argentina and Brazil, one based on socioeconomic factors as opposed
double taxation, and construct a second bridge to link the two nations by road at Iguaqu. Argentina also
agreed to provide Brazil with excess natural gas production and uranium. MONIZ BANDEIRA, supra note
50, at 67.
82. Delfim Anuncia Criaplo de Comissdo Bilateral, JORNAL Do BRASIL, May 16, 1980, at 4. In
August of 1980, General Videla travelled to Brasilia where he and Figueiredo signed seven additional
agreements, including additional protocols to the nuclear pact of the previous May.
83. FRANCISCO THOMPSON FLORES NETO, INTEGRA4 AO E COOPERACAO BRASIL-ARGENTINA 5
(199 1); Meta 6 Criar Bases Politicas e Juridicas, supra note 8 1, at 22.
84. The Argentine leaders apparently believed that by tying themselves closer to the major power
in the Western Hemisphere, the United States, through such things as training the Nicaraguan contras,
Argentina would somehow be able to regain her former status as a regional power. Ironically, this had
been the Brazilian strategy of the 1960s and early 1970s but had already been abandoned as a failure.
85. Wayne A. Selcher, Brazilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s: From Wary Rivalry to Friendly
Competition, J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF., Summer 1985, at 25, 30.
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to traditional national defense strategies. 86 Accordingly, by the mid-1980s,
neither Argentina nor Brazil viewed the other as reciprocal threats but in-
stead saw each other as necessary partners whose mutual cooperation was
needed in order to overcome the serious problems both countries were fac-
ing with respect to world trade and the international banking community. 87
During a ceremony in November 1985 to inaugurate a new bridge near
Iguaqu Falls connecting Argentina with Brazil, then Argentine President
Raul Alfonsin (1983-89) and Brazilian President Jos& Sarney (1984-90)
agreed to establish a binational commission to review the possibilities for
greater bilateral economic cooperation and integration. The recommenda-
tions of that binational commission led to the Argentine-Brazilian Program
for Integration and Economic Cooperation (better known by its Spanish
and Portuguese acronym ("PICAB")) on July 29, 1986.88 The original
PICAB included twelve Protocols that, among other things, liberalized
bilateral trade in capital goods, wheat, and consumer products. 89 On De-
cember 10, 1986, Alfonsin and Sarney signed the Act of Brazilian-
Argentine Friendship in Brasilia that added an additional five protocols to
the PICAB and was accompanied by a declaration committing both coun-
tries to mutual cooperation in nuclear research and the peaceful use of nu-
clear energy.90 Subsequent protocols created an important bilateral
managed trade regime for the automotive sector that remained in effect
until 2002.91
Through the PICAB, Argentina and Brazil both hoped to accomplish a
number of objectives. Perhaps one of the most important was to spark in-
ternal economic growth and thereby create domestic political stability by
increasing each country's trade with the other in a complementary fash-
ion.92 Another major objective was to strengthen Argentine and Brazilian
bargaining power with the outside world, particularly in the GATT Uru-
guay Round, so as to obtain greater access to the heavily protected agricul-
tural markets of the U.S. and Europe. 93 An underlying goal implicit in the
86. Id. at 35.
87. Oscar Camili6n, La Evaluaci6n Argentina, in ARGENTINA-BRASIL: EL LARGO CAMINO DE LA
tNTEGRACION 155, 157 (M6nica Hirst ed., 1988).
88. See, e.g., THOMAS ANDREW O'KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS 4-2 (2004)
[hereinafter O'KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS].
89. Id.
90. Id. at 4-5.
91- Idat5-10.1to5-17.
92. Neantro Saavedra-Rivano, A Integra(do Econ6mica Brasieiro-Argentina no Contexto da
Cooperaqdo Econ6mica Sul-Sul, in BRASIL-ARGENTINA-URUGUAI: A INTEGRAQAO EM DEBATE 69, 73
(Renato Baumann & Juan Carlos Lerda eds., 1987).
93. Id.
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PICAB, as evidenced by specific Protocols dealing with the nuclear sector,
was to strengthen Argentine-Brazilian relations in such a way that it would
render the traditional military hypothesis of inevitable conflict between
both countries permanently obsolete.
In November of 1998, Presidents Alfonsin and Samey met in Buenos
Aires to sign a Treaty of Integration and Economic Cooperation (which
came into effect the following year after it was ratified unanimously in both
the Argentine and Brazilian Congresses). 94 The Treaty committed both
countries to begin taking steps that would gradually culminate in an Argen-
tine-Brazilian common market by 1999.95 Although both countries were
wracked by severe economic crises at the time, forging closer Argentine-
Brazilian economic links made good political sense because the PICAB
was one of the few policy initiatives that had produced any positive
results.96
In order to demonstrate just how close Argentine-Brazilian relations
had become as a result of the PICAB, President Sarney visited a top secret
Argentine nuclear research station in Ezeiza following the signing cere-
mony for the Treaty of Integration and Economic Cooperation.97 Further
evidence was provided by the fact that the Argentine and the Brazilian
armies no longer used the other country as a potential enemy when con-
ducting war games. 98 As a result of these mutual changes in attitude, Presi-
dents Alfonsin and Samey were able to sign Protocol 23 to the PICAB in
November 1988, thereby permitting factories to be built along their respec-
tive common borders. 99 Prior to this time, traditional national security con-
cerns in both countries had dictated that development be directed at a safe
distance from the Argentine-Brazilian border and potential enemy artillery.
These traditional military concerns also explained why, prior to the 1990s,
Argentine roads and bridges near the Brazilian border were purposely con-
94. See, e.g., O'KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 88, at 4-2.
95. Id.
96. Tullo Vigevani & Joho Paulo Veiga, Mercosul e os Jnteresses Politicos e Sociais, 5 SAO
PAULO EM PERSPECTIVA, July/Sept. 1991, 44, 44-46. Throughout the late 1980s, as the PICAB was
implemented, trade between Argentina and Brazil grew significantly over historic levels.
97. See Hugo Martinez, Conv~nio corn Brasil bdsico para Argentina, 0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO,
Nov. 29, 1988, at 4; Hugo Martinez, Tabalho se sobrepbe asformalidades, 0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO,
Dec. 1, 1988, at 5.
98. A retired Brazilian vice admiral attending a Buenos Aires symposium sponsored by the gen-
eral staffs of the Argentine and Brazilian Armed Forces in April 1987 credited the PICA B with giving
each country's military a "new horizon." At this same symposium, the construction of a binational
nuclear submarine was proposed- See Military Affairs: Proposals.Jbr Closer Ties with Argentina, LATIN
AM. WKLY. REP., Apr. 23, 1987, at 9.
99. Mauricio Cardoso, Brasil e Argentina ddo passo final na integraCdo econ5mica, JORNAL DO
BRASIL, Nov. 27, 1988, at 19.
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structed so as not to withstand the weight of an invading Brazilian tank and
neither country utilized the same railroad gauge.
V. HOW THE APPEARANCE OF MERCOSUR HAS PERMANENTLY TRANS-
FORMED THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF SOUTH AMERICA'S SOUTHERN
CONE
On July 6, 1990, then Argentine President Carlos Menem (1989-99)
and Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92) signed the
Act of Buenos Aires. 100 The Act called for the creation of an Argentine-
Brazilian common market by 1995, instead of the 1999 date targeted by
both their predecessors. 101 The actual rules for eliminating duties and non-
tariff barriers between Argentina and Brazil were set down in Latin Ameri-
can Integration Association ("ALADI")102 Economic Complementation
Agreement No. 14 that came into effect on January 1, 1991. Fearful of
losing access to their largest export markets, Paraguay and Uruguay peti-
tioned to be included in this proposed Argentine-Brazilian common mar-
ket. 103 The result was the Treaty of Asuncion signed by Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay on March 26, 1991 (and incorporated into the
ALADI framework as Economic Complementation Agreement No. 18).104
The Treaty of Asuncion was ratified by the legislative powers in all four
countries on unanimous votes (except in Uruguay, where only two con-
gressmen voted against the proposal). 10 5
The Treaty of Asuncion sought to have a free trade area in place
among all four countries and a Common External Tariff ("CET") estab-
lished for goods imported from the outside world by 1995.106 In actuality,
the free trade area took some years longer to fully implement than origi-
nally contemplated, but today only sugar is still excluded from intrare-
gional free trade. 107 Similarly, while a CET was established by January 1,
1995, it only applied to about 85 percent of the tariff lines found on
MERCOSUR's harmonized tariff schedule. 108 Subsequent economic crises
100. See OKEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 88, at 4-1.
101. Id.at4-1,4-2.
102. ALADI, based in Montevideo, Uruguay, replaced the unsuccessful Latin American Free Trade
Area ("ALALC") effort in 1980. It encourages economic integration and among its membership: all the
Spanish speaking countries of South America plus Brazil and Mexico. For more detailed information
about ALALC and ALADI, see O'KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 88.
103. Id. at 4-1
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at4-1 to4-2.
107. Id. at 5-1.
108. Id.
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and preferential trade arrangements, not encompassing all four countries,
created additional perforations to the CET. 109 It is now expected that
MERCOSUR's CET will not be fully operational until 2010.110
As tariffs among the MERCOSUR countries were gradually elimi-
nated throughout the 1990s, intraregional trade exploded, nearly quadru-
pling to US$20 billion by 1998 over the level recorded in 1990.111
Interestingly, this dramatic growth in intra-MERCOSUR trade also came at
a time when MERCOSUR's exports to the rest of the world were also in-
creasing. 112 Subsequent economic crises, beginning with the maxi-
devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999, wreaked havoc on intra-
MERCOSUR trade flows (including a significant contraction in 2002). 113
Despite these setbacks, none of the MERCOSUR governments have re-
versed course and abandoned the integration process. 114 Following his
landslide victory in the October 2002 election and before he was even in-
augurated, Brazilian President Luiz Indcio Lula da Silva visited Argentina
and Chile to underscore the importance he attached to MERCOSUR as a
means of restoring economic growth and stability to the region.11 5 Joining
him in that vision was Nestor Kirchner, who became President of Argen-
tina in May 2003, and Nicanor Duarte Frutos, who assumed the Paraguayan
presidency on August 15, 2003.116
Today, MERCOSUR is a political and economic reality that, among
other things, supports democracy in South America's Southern Cone. For
example, in 1996 the MERCOSUR governments prevented a military coup
d'6tat in Paraguay by making clear to the plotters that the overthrow of then
President Juan Carlos Wasmosy would mean the immediate suspension of
Paraguay's membership in the MERCOSUR. 117 This was followed in July
1998 by the signing of the Protocol of Ushuaia by the presidents of all four
109. Id. at 5-1 to 5-5.
110. Id. at 5-5.
111. See Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, A Resurgent MERCOSUR: Confronting Economic Crises and
Negotiating Trade Agreements, 60 NORTH-SOUTH AGENDA PAPERS 4-5 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter
O'Keefe, A Resurgent MERCOSUR], available at http://www.miami.edu/nsc/publications/pub-ap-
pdf/60AP.pdf.
112. Id. at 5-6,
113. Id. at 5.
114. For a more detailed description of the recent trials and tribulations facing MERCOSUR and
how they have gradually been overcome, see O'Keefe, A Resurgent MERCOSUR, supra note I11.
115. !d. at 3.
116. Hector Tobar, Argentina's Leader Takes Office Amid High Hopes, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 2003,
at A4; Dignitaries Start to Arrivefor President's Inauguration, ORLANDO SENTIWEL, Aug. 15, 2003, at
A17.
117. O'KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 88, at 15-14.
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core MERCOSUR countries plus associate members Bolivia and Chile.118
The Protocol outlines a series of procedures to follow in the event of a
break in the democratic order in any of the signatory states. 119
MERCOSUR has also served as a catalyst for hundreds of cross-
border investments within the subregion, a phenomenon virtually unknown
prior to the 1990s and necessary to create internationally competitive
subregional firms. 120 Furthermore, MERCOSUR has widened the scope
and deepened the level of intraregional relations through "[r]egional infra-
structure initiatives, cooperative agendas in education and culture, and
heightened interaction among political actors of [the] member states." 121
More recently, MERCOSUR has proven itself an effective counter-
weight to U.S. special interest groups that are trying to whittle down the
originally ambitious agenda to create a genuine Free Trade Area of the
Americas ("FTAA") that encompasses thirty-four countries. This is be-
cause the MERCOSUR countries as a bloc have refused to open up their
lucrative services sector or government procurement opportunities to U.S.
firms until the U.S. makes meaningful concessions on reducing agricultural
subsidy programs and reforming its abusive antidumping laws. Because
there are more U.S. businesses that would profit from unlimited access to
the MERCOSUR market than benefit from agricultural subsidies or the
protection afforded by antidumping duties, the MERCOSUR bloc's strat-
egy has increased the pressure on the White House to cede on these issues
in order to secure an FTAA. The existence of MERCOSUR has also facili-
tated talks to create a trans-Atlantic free trade area between the European
Union and South America's Southern Cone by reducing the number of
separate offers that have to be considered during the negotiations.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120 See, e.g., Pedro da Motta Veiga, Brazil in Mercosur: Reciprocal Influence, in MERCOSUR:
REGIONAL INTEGRATION, WORLD MARKETS 25, 30 (Riordan Roett ed., 1999). Da Motta Viega empha-
sizes that MERCOSUR was responsible for the most important changes of the 1990s to Brazilian
foreign trade patterns, by favoring export of goods with a higher degree of technological innovation. Id.
at 30-31. This encouraged small and medium-sized firms in Brazil to export for the first time. Id. at 30.
MERCOSUR also has encouraged increased Brazilian foreign investment in the subregion, thereby
playing an important role in the internationalization of Brazilian firms. Id. at 3 1.
121. Monica Hirst, Mercosur's Complex Political Agenda, in MERCOSUR: REGIONAL
INTEGRATION, WORLD MARKETS, supra note 120, at 35, 43. Hirst notes that besides "these initiatives at
the local and federal levels, cross-border interaction has been intense among business sectors, social
organizations, and political elites, and interprovincial networking is [a reality] between the southern
states of Brazil and the northern provinces of Argentina." Id.
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
VI. Is AN ECONOMICALLY INTEGRATED BALKANS FEASIBLE?
The idea of economically integrating the Balkans through the creation
of a free trade area or customs union or an even more ambitious economic
union is neither far-fetched nor an historical anomaly. 122 Balkan federation
schemes, which consisted of various combinations among Albania, Bul-
garia, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, were hatched following
WW 11. 123 "The most important of the many Balkan plans.., was the Bul-
garian-Yugoslav scheme that, in some of its versions, also envisaged the
'integration' of Albania."' 124 An agreement signed by Yugoslavia and Bul-
garia at Bled in August 1947 included reference to preparations for a cus-
toms union and, according to some participants, even discussed political
federation. 12 5 None of these schemes ever prospered as they were nixed by
Josef Stalin and Yugoslavia was eventually expelled from the
COMINFORM in late June 1948, following Tito's disagreements with
Soviet leaders on how to best achieve socialism. 126 Among those Eastern
European countries that remained within the Soviet Bloc, however, efforts
continued during the first half of the 1960s to turn the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance ("CMEA") into a more advanced form of economic
integration. 127 These proposals ultimately foundered on Romanian
opposition.128
122. In his seminal work on the subject matter, Bela Balassa identified five basic forms that eco-
nomic integration can take. BELA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (1961). The
first and least complicated consists of the creation of a free trade area in which tariffs and quantitative
restrictions are eliminated on trade between participating countries, although each nation retains its
tariff structure as against nonparticipants. Id. A customs union adds to the free trade area the equaliza-
tion of tariffs by participating states against imports from nonmembers (i.e., the implementation of a
Common External Tariff or CET). Id. A common market includes free trade in commodities among
participating states, a CET, as well as the elimination of restrictions on the free movement of factors of
production (i.e., labor and capital) among the member states. Id. An economic union adds to the com-
mon market framework some degree of harmonization of national economic policies in order to remove
discrimination that was due to previous disparities among participating states in these policies (e.g., the
creation of a Central Bank with some supranational powers). Id. "Finally, total economic integration
presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies and requires the
[establishment] of a supra-national authority whose decisions are binding for the member states" (i.e., in
essence the establishment of a political federation). Id.
123. JOSEF M. VAN BRABANT, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: A HANDBOOK 12
(1989).
124. Id.
125. Stirk & Weigall, supra note 7, at 36.
126. VAN BRABANT, supra note 123, at 11.
127. Id. at 63-69.
128. Id. at 69. Romania's opposition appears to have been premised, in part, on a long tradition of
protectionism dating back to the nineteenth century, as well as a feeling that an ambitious integration
project that included ceding sovereignty to a supranational body was incompatible with the concept of a
socialist state and the need to foster the development of an industrial proletariat through the promotion
of heavy industry. Id.
[Vol 80:187
ECONOMIC INTEGRA TION IN THE BALKANS
The pressing need exhibited by Kosovo and most countries that for-
merly made up Yugoslavia to expand export opportunities and create real
opportunities for local entrepreneurs is underscored by the dismal eco-
nomic progress they have made to date. The problem in Kosovo is further
compounded by the failure to resolve its final status under international
law. Accordingly, the unemployment rate in Kosovo hovers close to 70%,
the average month's pay is about US$220, and there is no significant for-
eign direct investment. 129 Widespread unemployment, limited purchasing
power of the majority of the populace, and little foreign direct investment is
also the rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montene-
gro.130 The economic performance of Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania has
also been erratic.
In the particular case of Kosovo, resolution of its final status and the
elimination of tariffs on intra-Balkan trade would create opportunities for
sustained economic growth. At the same time, however, it must be ac-
knowledged that one thing that could undermine any effort to economically
integrate the Balkans is the heavy dependence by some governments on the
revenue collected from import duties. Kosovo is said to be especially de-
pendent on revenue generated through import tariffs. Accordingly, any
attempt to liberalize intraregional trade will require temporary financial
assistance for governments like Kosovo as they scramble to find new reve-
nue streams generated from the economic growth that regional free trade
will likely bring.
Ernest Haas and Philippe Schmitter, two well-known neo-functionalist
political theorists, have identified five conditions which give strength to the
economic integration process and enhance its integrative potential. 13 1 The
first of these holds that a region is "more likely to develop a viable plan if
no units [within] the proposed union present an overpowering presence in
size and power vis-d-vis other units." 132 The second posits that the more
129. Stefan Wagstyl, Kosovo Frustrations Simmering as Inter-Ethnic Tensions Remain Unresolved,
FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2004, at 6.
130. See, e.g., The Regatta Sets Sail, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 52-53; Something Rotten,
ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 40.
131. William P. Avery & James D. Cochrane, Innovation in Latin American Regionalism: The
Andean Common Market, 27 INT'L ORG. 181, 207 (1973). Three schools of political theories of eco-
nomic integration exist: "the federalist approach [now largely discredited], which emphasizes the role
of institutions; the transactional approach [considered outdated], which stresses transactions between
people; and the neo-functionalist approach, which focuses on the ways in which supranational institu-
tions emerge from a convergence of interests of various significant groups in society." ALICIA PUYANA
DE PALACIOS, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG UNEQUAL PARTNERS: THE CASE OF THE ANDEAN
GROUP xxi (1982).
132. Avery & Cochrane, supra note 131, at 207. This view of relative power-size homogeneity has
been attacked by others who argue that "core areas" within a proposed union can provide a centripetal
force or locomotive effect that initially helps push the integration process forward.
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preexisting integration or mutual interdependence there is before integra-
tion, the greater the proposed union's integrative potential.133 The third
condition listed by Haas and Schmitter is "the extent to which each country
exhibits a pluralistic socio-political structure." 134 The expectation is that
the greater the level of democratic pluralism, the greater the project's po-
tential for success. 135 The fourth condition is based on the degree of com-
plementation of elite values (i.e., the opinions of political and business
leaders, intellectuals, and pundits) within the proposed union. 136 Finally,
the level of actual or perceived external dependence can give strength to
the integration process. 137 In this context, it is important to examine the
environment of world politics in which a regional integration process is
being carried out because historically unique factors can serve as an impor-
tant catalyst for initiating or furthering the process.138
133. Id. at209.
134. Id. at 207.
135. Id. at 214. The fact that the advantages and drawbacks of an integration process can be openly
debated should mean that any final decision to proceed with such a project has strong societal support
that will help overcome temporary setbacks that may appear on the road to economic integration.
136. Id. at 207. "In general, the greater the [complementation of opinion among] elites with effec-
tive power over economic policy as reflected in similar statements and policies toward the most salient
political-economic issues in their region, the better the conditions for positive or integrative response."
J.S. Nye, Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model, 24 INT'L ORG. 796, 817
(1970). For example, by the early 1990s, there was widespread support for closely integrating the
Argentine and Brazilian economies among politicians, business executives, academics, and other opin-
ion makers in both societies, thereby facilitating the creation of MERCOSUR. On the other hand, there
was little consensus in Central America as to the wisdom of creating a Common Market during the
1960s, contributing, in part, to the eventual stagnation of that integration process. Similarly, large
numbers of the opinion makers in certain EU countries have resisted the idea of surrendering macro-
economic policymaking to the European Central Bank, hence the refusal by Denmark, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom to adopt the euro as their monetary unit.
137. Avery & Cochrane, supra note 131, at 207. High levels of perceived dependence, whether the
result of threats from the external world, exports to predominantly one country, or high reliance on
external moral and physical aid, is thought to reinforce the desire for unity in order to "get out from
under" the domination of the metropolitan power. Mario Barrera & Ernst B. Haas, The Operationaliza-
tion of Some Variables Related to Regional Integration: A Research Note, 23 INT'L ORG. 150, 152
(1969).
138. J.S. Nye, Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration, 19 INT'L ORG. 870, 882 (1965). For
example, Nye points out that "European integration was helped by its initiation in an environment in
which Europe had (as a result of [WW II]) undergone a drastic change from autonomous actor to pawn
in a bipolar power struggle." Id. at 883.
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TABLE 1 Key socioeconomic indicators of the Balkan region
GDP (in Billions of Per Capita GDP in
Population U.S. dollars) U.S. dollars
Albania 3.6 16.1 4,500
Bosnia-Herzegovina 4.1 24.4 6,100
Bulgaria 7.5 57.1 7,600
Croatia 4.5 47.1 10,700
Kosovo 2.2 2.1 960
Macedonia 2.1 13.8 6,700
Romania 22.4 154.4 6,900
Serbia-Montenegro 8.8 21.9 2,048
Source: The CIA World Factbook for 2004 & Kosovo Provisional Institutions for Self-
Government.
Note: Population figures are 2004 estimates. Remaining Statistics are based on 2003 Data.
Using Haas and Scbmitter's criteria, it would appear that economi-
cally integrating the Balkans, particularly the former Republics of Yugo-
slavia, Bulgaria, and Kosovo, is viable. In terms of population and the size
of their respective economies, none of the countries and territories that
would make up a Balkan free trade area or other type of union overpowers
the others in terms of size and power. The big exception is Romania, al-
though the actual purchasing power of Romanians is on par with those of
most fellow Balkan residents.
For Haas and Schmitter's second condition, the economies of the for-
mer republics of Yugoslavia and Kosovo were very well integrated and
mutually interdependent prior to the civil wars. For example, before Yugo-
slavia's disintegration, Kosovo supplied the Yugoslav republics with col-
ored metals and lignite coal. Kosovo also used to export electricity to
Montenegro and Croatia through Serbia. This integration and mutual inter-
dependence continues today, albeit severely diminished over previously
recorded levels. Import-Export data for 2001 indicates that all the former
republics count at least one or more countries that made up the old Yugo-
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slavia (including, interestingly, Slovenia) as among their top five trading
partners. 139 Albania and Bulgaria also count some of the former Yugoslav
republics as their top five trading partners.140 In addition, Bulgaria contrib-
utes significantly to the Albanian import basket. 14 1 The big exception to a
high level of prior integration and mutual interdependence among the Bal-
kan countries is Romania.142
More problematic in predicting the future viability of an economically
integrated Balkans lies in fulfillment of Haas and Schmitter's third vari-
able. Many of the former Yugoslav republics still do not have fully plural-
istic sociopolitical structures, especially when it comes to respecting the
rights of certain ethnic minorities. This deficiency has also slowed their
accession into the EU, which requires compliance with the so-called Co-
penhagen criteria of liberal democracy and respect for human rights. 14 3
However, given that all these countries are now firmly embarked in con-
structing representative democracies, it does not seem implausible that they
will be able to achieve fuller pluralism sometime in the near future.
A question mark also exists with respect to meeting Haas and Schmit-
ter's fourth condition concerning regional complementation of elite values.
Although there are indications of momentum building in favor of a "Bal-
kans without Borders," it is still unclear just how pervasive support for
such a concept is among elected leaders and other opinion makers in the
region. This is particularly true in those countries (such as Bulgaria and
Romania) where participating in a Balkans economic integration project
might create a distraction from efforts to join the EU that are already
underway.
As for Haas and Schmitter's fifth condition, all the Balkan countries
identified as candidates for the proposed South Eastern European Balkan
economic integration project are highly dependent on outside capital for
development and, in some cases, survive only because of foreign donor
relief money and remittances from nationals living abroad. 144 Accordingly,
this situation facilitates integrating the Balkans, albeit not necessarily in the
139. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, "Economy" Category for Albania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro (2003), available at
http://www.frogcement.com/fbook3/.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Martin Wolf, Europe Risks Destruction to Widen Peace and Prosperity, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2002, at 23.
144. See, e.g., CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK (2004), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (citing the "economy" category for Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Serbia & Montenegro).
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way foreseen by Hass and Schmitter (e.g., to reduce dependence on one
dominant trading partner). Instead this high dependence can be used by
foreign economic powers to steer the Balkan countries towards greater
economic integration, particularly if accompanied by important carrots
such as generous development aid money or as a precondition for joining
the EU.
Although it is true that on at least two conditions (i.e., power-size ho-
mogeneity and preexisting integration or mutual interdependency) Romania
is the odd man out, the inclusion of Romania in any proposed Balkan inte-
gration scheme might be beneficial from a Kosovar perspective given that
Romania's 22.3 million mostly non-Slavic inhabitants could serve as a
counterweight to the 25 or so million Slavs from the other Balkan states. 145
Without the presence of the Romanians, both Albania and Kosovo (and
their brethren in Macedonia) would be in the distinct minority, not just on
ethnic, but also on cultural and religious grounds.
CONCLUSION
Both the EU and MERCOSUR integration projects provide valuable
lessons for any effort to economically integrate the Balkans. Perhaps the
most important is that successful economic integration can be used as a
way to permanently banish the specter of war and inevitable conflict among
those countries participating in any such process. However, it is important
to emphasize that for this to happen the economic integration projects must
also remain dynamic and offer tangible opportunities, such as increased
trade flows or growth in cross-border investment, or both. Just as Latin
America offers MERCOSUR as a successful example of integration (espe-
cially in the political sphere) there are other Latin American projects that
were unable to prevent war among their members. For example, in 1969
war broke out between Honduras and El Salvador, both members of the
Central American Common Market. 14 6 Similarly, in 1981 and again in
1995, Ecuador and Peru fought over boundary disputes in the Amazon
despite both countries participation in a regional customs union. The com-
mon factor in both of these examples is that by the time armed conflicts
broke out, the respective integration processes had long since stagnated and
initial positive gains had even been reversed. 147
145. Seetbl. 1.
146. See, e.g., O'KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 88, at I-4.
147. Id.
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Both the EU and MERCOSUR also provide evidence for the proposi-
tion that regional economic integration provides a way to strengthen weak
democracies by requiring liberal democracy and respect for human rights
as a condition for initial entry and continued access to the benefits provided
by membership. 148 Furthermore, the EU experience with subsidiarity and
supranational bodies indicates that spaces can be created for long sup-
pressed national subgroups to develop culturally and politically in a fairly
autonomous fashion with minimal economic disruption or bloodshed.
From the Kosovar perspective, the exact form of economic integration
any Balkans project pursues depends, to a large degree, on the final deter-
mination of Kosovo's status under international law. If full independence is
pursued, a free trade area would probably make the most sense because
Kosovo would retain sovereignty to set its own tariff policy on nonregional
imports and collect any duty revenue for its own purposes. On the other
hand, opting for a loose confederation with Serbia and Montenegro might
make an economic union more attractive, because Kosovo would inevitably
retain important rulemaking powers over an array of subject matters that
require local oversight and implementation. In addition, this deeper form of
economic integration implies the existence of supranational bodies where
big policy issues such as international trade relations would presumably be
decided on regionally and not in Belgrade.
Whatever form of economic integration the Balkan countries adopt,
this decision, in and of itself, should not impede their eventual accession
into the EU. For example, the three Benelux countries were incorporated
into the old EEC as an already existing customs union. 149 The EU has also
not been adverse to allowing large numbers of countries to join the block at
one time, as evidenced by the ten new countries that became members in
May 2004.150 If anything, a deeper form of Balkan integration could facili-
tate incorporation of the whole subregion en masse because the EU would
be dealing with an already established and cohesive economic unit and
would need to make only one tariff offer to the whole block and not to
several countries. This is one important lesson from the current negotia-
tions to create an EU-MERCOSUR free trade area, where it is the EU as
much as MERCOSUR that wants to negotiate bloc to bloc. 15 1 In addition,
148. Id, at 15-14.
149. K.P.E. LASOK & D. LASOK, THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 9-10 (7th
ed. 2001).
150. Katinka Barysch, EU Enlargement: How to Reap the Benefits, ECON. TRENDS, June 2004, at
28, available at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/barysch_economictrends.june%2004.pdf.
151. Although it has increased the negotiating power of the MERCOSUR countries (particularly
the three smaller members) in the FTAA negotiations, U.S. negotiators have now also come to appreci-
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the carrot of EU accession provides an important incentive to prevent back-
sliding on strengthening representative democracy, respect for human
rights, and economic reform.
ate the bloc as facilitating negotiation logistics because at least four of the thirty-four countries have
already worked things out among themselves before they sit down at the negotiating table.
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